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Game theory based prey-predator interactions

日期:2018-08-23  作者:  点击:[]

报告人:  徐霏 博士

时  间: 2018年8月25日上午:9:30-10:30

地  点: 数学院一楼学术报告厅

摘  要: The introduced dispersal-foraging game is a combination of prey habitat selection between two patch types and optimal foraging approaches. Prey’s patch preference and forager behavior determine the prey’s survival rate. The forager’s energy gain depends on local prey density in both types of exhaustible patches and on leaving time. We introduce two game-solution concepts. The static solution combines the ideal free distribution of the prey with optimal-foraging theory. The dynamical solution is given by a game dynamics describing the behavioral changes of prey and forager. We show (1) that each stable equilibrium dynamical solution is always a static solution, but not conversely; (2) that at an equilibrium dynamical solution, the forager can stabilize prey mixed patch use strategy in cases where ideal free distribution theory predicts that prey will use only one patch type; and (3) that when the equilibrium dynamical solution is unstable at fixed prey density, stable behavior cycles occur where neither forager nor prey keep a fixed behavior. We then investigate the dynamics of a predator-prey system with the assumption that both prey and predators use game theory-based strategies to maximize their per capita population growth rates. The predators adjust their strategies in order to catch more prey per unit time, while the prey, on the other hand, adjust their reactions to minimize the chances of being caught. We assume each individual is either mobile or sessile and investigate the evolution of mobility for each species in the predator-prey system. When the underlying population dynamics is of the Lotka-Volterra type, we show that strategies evolve to the equilibrium predicted by evolutionary game theory and that population sizes approach their corresponding stable equilibrium (i.e. strategy and population effects can be analyzed separately). This is no longer the case when population dynamics is based on the Holling II functional response, although the strategic analysis still provides a valuable intuition into the long term outcome. Numerical simulation results indicate that, for some parameter values, the system has chaotic behavior. Our investigation reveals the relationship between the game theory-based reactions of prey and predators, and their population changes.

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  • 清华大学数学系
  • 浙江大学数学科学院
  • 上海大学数学系
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